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Prospects for Peace: Challenges and Opportunities for the Myanmar Peace Process
By Tabea Campbell Pauli
It has been over half a year now since the democratic transfer of leadership to Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD government, giving citizens, stakeholders and onlookers an idea of the direction and progress of peacebuilding in Myanmar. Recent resurgences of conflict in several ethnic states, as well as accusations of violence against civilians by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military), have been taken as a test of will and ability of the government to confront these issues and hold military forces accountable to the nation’s laws and constitution. While skeptics might say that the outlook is not promising for a swift and straightforward end to the conflict, many citizens are
their positions separately. Many ethnic communities have lived in more or less autonomous systems of EAO (ethnic armed organisation) governance for many decades, often with alternative economic, political and social institutions that are closely connected to the conflict. For instance, illegal trade across Myanmar’s borders in weapons, narcotics, gems, natural resources, endangered animals and trafficked people, generate immense income for so-called ‘conflict entrepreneurs’. Through systems of taxation and protection, these significant revenues are amassed, whilst effectively disregarding human rights abuses, land-grabbing and environmental destruction.
On top of these entrenched systems, active conflicts in Rakhine, Shan and Kachin states reveal the complexity of layers and interconnections in Myanmar’s governance landscape. This year, Rakhine State has witnessed horrific violence in mixed Muslim and Buddhist communities, along with mass displacement of increasingly vulnerable populations. The Tatmadaw has repeatedly been accused of criminal activity by inhabitants, journalists and aid workers in the area, such as extra-judicial killings and sexual violence, and it is apparently protected by the constitution. Meanwhile, many accuse the government of insufficient, or even complicit behaviour with the Tatmadaw’s dangerous, racist and perhaps genocidal actions, and claim that Myanmar remains a country run by its military. It is hard to imagine how these situations of violence, exploitation and corruption may be broken down and resolved following a national ceasefire, for the country to begin rebuilding a peace-focused society, and a political system that is committed to democracy and transparency. Two significant challenges impeding the current peace process, as stated by officials working in this field, are a lack of trust and a lack of inclusion. Both arise from the complex background of Myanmar’s peace process as it affects the relationships between groups and the choices they make. A combination of the long history of conflict, which has entrenched the various perspectives and positions of parties, and clashes on the ground between the Tatmadaw and EAOs, continues to weaken their goodwill at the negotiating table, which can only slow the progress of the peace process. To counter this negativity and suspicion, parties must demonstrate their trustworthiness and a willingness to cooperate by continuing active participation, and meeting in person, through respectful and cordial interaction. Positions would be made clear by all parties, and promises would be kept. Some believe that trust levels in the peace process are currently at an all-time low, following renewed fighting and troubles in negotiation, and what is required is for stakeholders to continue coming together to share the experiences and interests of the Myanmar’s different communities. Achieving real inclusivity is perhaps the greatest challenge facing the success of the peace process at this time. This inclusion can be understood in two ways. Firstly, it is critical for all EAOs to be invited to join peace negotiations, and to sign the NCA (nationwide ceasefire agreement). Since October 2015, only eight out of twenty EAOs have signed the agreement with the Tatmadaw and the national government, for which there are several reasons. The ANC, LDU and WNO were excluded on the basis that they are non-military organisations, and therefore should not be part of ceasefire negotiations. The NSCN and UWSA already hold bilateral ceasefire treaties with the Tatmadaw, choosing to forego the multilateral NCA. However, the AA, MNDAA and TNLA have been blocked from participating by the Tatmadaw, on the grounds that they were created after the peace process was initiated by U Thein Sein’s government, and thus do not have existing bilateral ceasefire treaties which contain clear disarmament protocols. Furthermore, the Tatmadaw does not want to legitimise these organisations by including them, which could encourage the creation of more and more EAOs across the country. Consequently, the KIA refused to sign the NCA in solidarity with these EAOs, demanding that the process become truly inclusive first. These four EAOs have become known as the Northern Alliance – Burma (NA), and in October 2016 began engaging in offensives against the Tatmadaw in Shan and Kachin states. Many point out that by fighting against the KIA, the Tatmadaw is breaking its own bilateral ceasefire terms, and causing many Kachins to be killed, injured and displaced. The reasons for this renewed conflict are seen by some to be a show of force by the Tatmadaw, trying to subordinate the EAOs, and by others as a protest by the EAOs against their exclusion from the NCA. What has become increasingly clear is that the Tatmadaw is the main agent in Myanmar’s peace process, not the government, and that it is unwilling to work alongside other groups to keep the peace process moving forward. At this moment in time, it is critical for the EAOs to remain united in negotiations, because their best chance of winning their own fight is to set aside their differences, trust and enable each other in the pursuit of their common goals. Facing them, the Tatmadaw can be seen to undermine the EAOs’ unity, trying to strengthen the divisions between them by deploying ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics. One example of this is refusing to let some EAOs sign the NCA. There is a danger in EAOs letting themselves be isolated, as this weakens their collective negotiating power, and alienates the communities which they represent, from the future nation-building project. The second point to be made about inclusion in the peace process concerns the diversity of Myanmar’s people. Because the NCA is seen by many people to be a military agreement, many non-military stakeholders have been excluded. This includes women, youth, civil society and faith-based organisations, as well as IDPs, members of ethnic minorities, refugees and people with disabilities. It is important for all of these voices to be heard during the peace talks, so that the discussion can benefit from their different knowledge, experiences and perspectives on many different issues. This is the only way for Myanmar to build a socially just, representative and equitable post-conflict society. Civil society actors have important knowledge of many communities’ situations ‘on the ground’, as they work on issues of rights, advocacy and activism. Furthermore, they are often embedded in marginalised and minority communities that are not well represented by EAOs or the government. Political parties must also play a bigger role in peace talks, because they are the middle ground between the Tatmadaw and EAOs, as legitimate, civilian and democratic groups. As the peace process continues, they will become the voice of their communities, articulating the interests and concerns of those that they represent, while making decisions on policies in parliament. Another important group that must be heard from is women. Although they have played central roles in the Myanmar’s conflict as leaders, combatants, protesters, advocates, prisoners and victims of violence, their voices are not heard enough in the formal negotiations. The consequence of this underrepresentation is that Myanmar will not be able to end the institutional sexism and gender discrimination which results in the horrible violence and abuse suffered by women in this country, and post-war society would not be fully equal, just or democratic. Women must be heard beyond discussions of an old-fashioned and male-dominated idea of ‘gender issues’, such as raising children and caring for family. If this inclusion can be achieved, Myanmar will gradually see an evolution in the roles and opportunities available to different groups, as the peace process continues. Simultaneously, it is important to think about the place of the international community in Myanmar’s transition to peace. There is a high number of foreign organisations who act as donors, employers and technical advisers within the peace process, and therefore have a considerable amount of influence on the decisions and overall direction it takes. There is a danger that decisions involving large sums of money could be made based on wrong assumptions or information, which could lead to unintended support for particular groups or interests. For example, since the election of Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD government, many international actors have shifted their focus and support in their direction, thinking that the transition to democracy has ‘solved’ the main problems of conflict, and that the best thing to do is to strengthen the government’s ability. However, the lack of democracy was never the single problem in Myanmar’s conflict. Much more deep-rooted issues concern representation, self-determination, minority rights and control over land and resources. For many of these issues, the government does not represent the voices and interests of all citizens, particularly those from ethnic states. For this reason, it is important that the international community continues to support other groups who do represent these communities, such as EAOs, CSO/CBOs, FBOs and ethnic political parties. By doing this, they would help maintain impartiality, and a level playing field in the national peace process. At this stage of the peace process, many people are looking toward the future, and wondering how best to move forward. A popular idea which is gaining more and more support is the creation of a federal union in Myanmar. This idea originates in the first Panglong conference in 1948, where independence leaders imagined a federal republic based on the divisions of ethnic states and regions, giving them the autonomy and self-determination that many of them have been fighting for since this time. To reach this goal, great knowledge of political systems and citizenship are required, which has been weakened in Myanmar by many years of poor civic education in schools. Furthermore, the negotiations to reach decisions around federal systems of security, taxation, foreign policy, or education, will be complicated by the large number of stakeholders that would be involved. However, for many people, this is the only system that could see all groups’ demands satisfied in a democratic and sustainable way, through cooperation, collaboration and reconciliation around shared goals. The support, energy and enthusiasm for this immense task may come from the incredible force of Myanmar peoples’ will for peace. Across the country, protests call for an end to conflict, while young people are enrolling in education programmes in greater numbers, embracing the many opportunities that are beginning to appear as the peace process continues. The voices of Myanmar communities come together across ethnic, political, religious and geographical divisions, demanding an end to conflict, and a sustainable, democratic and just peace in their country. Tabea Campbell Pauli is a researcher on the Myanmar peace process. Through her bachelor’s degree in Social Anthropology from the University of Edinburgh, followed by a MSc (cum laude) in International Development Studies from the University of Amsterdam, she has focused on issues of peace education and social justice in multicultural and multi ethnic communities. She currently resides in Yangon, Myanmar. |
